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ABSTRACT Many network services and tools (e.g. network monitors, malware-detection systems, routing
and billing policy enforcement modules in ISPs) depend on identifying the type of traffic that passes
through the network. With the widespread use of mobile devices, the vast diversity of mobile apps, and the
massive adoption of encryption protocols (such as TLS), large-scale encrypted traffic classification becomes
increasingly difficult. In this paper, we propose a deep learning model for mobile app identification that
works even with encrypted traffic. The proposed model only needs the payload of the first few packets for
classification, and, hence, it is suitable even for applications that rely on early prediction, such as routing
and QoS provisioning. The deep model achieves between 84% to 98% accuracy for the identification
of 80 popular apps. We also perform occlusion analysis to bring insight into what data is leaked from
SSL/TLS protocol that allows accurate app identification. Moreover, our traffic analysis shows that many
apps generate not only app-specific traffic, but also numerous ambiguous flows. Ambiguous flows are flows
generated by common functionality modules, such as advertisement and traffic analytics. Because such
flows are common among many different apps, identifying the source app that generates ambiguous flows is
challenging. To address this challenge, we propose a CNN+LSTM model that uses adjacent flows to learn
the order and pattern of multiple flows, to better identify the app that generates them. We show that such flow
association considerably improves the accuracy, particularly for ambiguous flows. Furthermore, we show
that our approach is robust to mixed traffic scenarios where some unrelated flows may appear in adjacent
flows. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that identifies the source app for ambiguous flows.
INDEX TERMS convolutional neural network, deep learning, flow association, mobile app identification,
occlusion analysis, recurrent neural network, smartphone app fingerprinting, traffic classification
I. INTRODUCTION
NETWORK traffic classification assigns labels to net-work traffic flows. Depending on its purpose, the labels
can be various apps (e.g. Facebook, YouTube, and Skype),
different traffic types (e.g. streaming, downloading, and
browsing), user actions (e.g. liking or sharing), etc. Network
traffic classification has been widely used for applying rout-
ing or billing policy, enforcing QoS requirements, identifying
security threats or anomalies in firewalls or malware detec-
tion systems, etc. Because of its wide applications, traffic
classification has been studied for more than two decades.
The earliest attempts to classify network traffic relied
mostly on port numbers in TCP/UDP packets. Such ap-
proaches, however, are no longer sufficient because modern
apps and protocols are often not tightly bound to a specific
unique port number. The next set of approaches has focused
on manually identifying patterns and keywords in unen-
crypted parts of the payload, called deep packet inspection
(DPI). Nevertheless, such approaches are time-consuming
and labor-intensive since they require continual manual ex-
traction of signatures [1]. Furthermore, their applicability has
been reduced as more traffic is encrypted.
To address the limitations of such methods, classical ma-
chine learning approaches have emerged. Classical machine
learning approaches, such as support vector machine (SVM),
K-nearest neighbor (KNN), etc., have achieved the state-of-
the-art accuracy for many years. However, these approaches
mostly rely on statistical features obtained from the entire
flow which are not suitable for early classification, where
the result of the classification is needed after observing the
beginning of a flow. Furthermore, the rapid spread of mobile
devices has dramatically changed the traffic pattern of the
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Internet. Mobile app identification poses a new challenge-
the existence of a large number of applications. Due to
the inability to capture more complex patterns for a large
number of classes, the accuracy of traditional approaches has
reduced.
In recent years, deep learning has been widely adopted
in various application scenarios from image recognition to
text translation. A few recent studies show that deep learning
models can achieve high accuracy for network traffic classi-
fication [2]–[4] and they do not require manual feature se-
lection. However, these studies are limited to a small number
of services or traffic types and their accuracy has yet to be
investigated on large-scale mobile app identification.
In this paper, we focus on two main challenges in mobile
app identification. First, we aim to solve the app identification
problem for a large number of classes, generally known as
extreme classification in machine learning. Although a few
studies have already achieved acceptable accuracy in extreme
classification, we perform an occlusion analysis to better
understand the reason why deep models work. Second, we
aim to identify source apps for ambiguous traffic flows. Our
analysis of the traffic shows that many apps generate not only
app-specific flows, but also numerous ambiguous flows. Am-
biguous flows are generated by embedded modules that are
common among many different apps, such as advertisement,
or common Web-API traffic flows [5]. Identifying ambiguous
traffic (i.e. labeling them as ambiguous) is shown to be possi-
ble [5]. However, identifying the source app that generates
ambiguous traffic flows has not been studied before. The
problem is challenging because ambiguous traffic can be
generated by multiple apps and patterns in such traffic might
be similar even when it is generated by different apps.
To tackle these challenges, we propose two deep learning
models. We use a convolutional neural network (CNN) model
for the identification of large scale mobile apps. Our dataset
is comprised of 80 apps from a wide range of categories,
including streaming, messaging, news, navigation, etc. We
show that the proposed deep learning model achieves high
accuracy across many network and encryption protocols for
app identification by using payload information of the first
few packets.
To solve the second challenge of identifying the source app
of an ambiguous flow, we develop a joint CNN and LSTM
architecture building upon the developed CNN model. The
model takes a few consecutive flows as input to identify the
app that generates the first flow. The insight is that although
one ambiguous traffic flow may not present any unique pat-
tern, a set of consecutive flows that are generated by a single
app presents unique patterns. The CNN part of the model
captures the patterns in the header and payload of packets in
each flow, while the LSTM part captures sequential patterns
in adjacent flows. We show that our model is robust even if
some flows belonging to other apps are taken into the model
along with the app that we are interested in identifying.
In summary, the contribution of this paper is as follows:
• We show that a CNN model is capable of identifying
mobile apps for 80-class classification with high ac-
curacy. We perform fine-grained occlusion analysis for
the first time on our proposed CNN model for traffic
classification task. Our results bring insight into why
a deep learning model can classify SSL and transport
layer security (TLS) traffic flows. We show that certain
handshake fields of SSL/TLS protocol leak enough in-
formation for app identification.
• Building upon the first CNN model, we propose a joint
CNN+LSTM model to identifying the source app of
ambiguous traffic flows as well as regular app-related
traffic flows. Unlike previous studies where ambiguous
traffic flows were removed or only detected as ambigu-
ous, our joint model takes adjacent flows to identify the
source app of the first flow and achieve high accuracy.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
that takes the relation of several flows into account for
identifying the source apps of ambiguous flows.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II covers the most related work in literature about gen-
eral traffic classification and smartphone app identification
approaches. In Section III, we explain the detailed system
architecture, including some definitions, input features, and
deep model architectures. Section IV contains our dataset
description and evaluation of our models on real data. In
Section V, we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Although general traffic classification seems to be similar
to mobile app identification, there are some differences in
the types of traffic and patterns generated by smartphones
that make them distinct from traditional traffic classification
or website fingerprinting [5], [6]. As a result, the studies in
literature are divided into two groups: general traffic classifi-
cation and mobile app identification.
A. GENERAL TRAFFIC CLASSIFICATION
Classical machine learning approaches have been widely
used in the past for network traffic classification [7]. Both
supervised methods, including C4.5 [8], [9], K-nearest neigh-
bor [10], [11], SVM [12]–[14], naive Bayes [15], [16] and
unsupervised methods, such as Gaussian mixture model [17]
and K-means [18], [19] have been used in the past. These
methods often rely on statistical features of the entire flow,
such as average packet length, standard deviation of inter-
arrival time of packet, etc., for classification which is not suit-
able for early prediction. Early prediction refers to scenarios
where prediction is required as soon as traffic is observed by
using the beginning of the flow. Routing, QoS provisioning,
and malware-detection are just a few applications of traffic
classification where early prediction is necessary. Moreover,
the accuracy of such classical approaches have declined
because of their simplicity, manual feature selection, and
incapability of learning complex patterns [20].
Recently, deep learning models have shown tremendous
success in a wide range of applications from image recogni-
2 VOLUME 4, 2016
Author et al.: Preparation of Papers for IEEE TRANSACTIONS and JOURNALS
tion to text translation and speech recognition. The network
community has also started applying deep learning models to
tackle the network traffic classification task [21]. Statistical
features of flows were converted into 2-dimensional arrays
and used as the input of a CNN model in [22]. They suc-
cessfully trained a model for a small number of classes for
traffic type classification. However, it cannot be used for early
prediction as the input is built based on the entire flow. In
[23], the authors used a combination of classical machine
learning and deep learning for classification of five Google
services that use QUIC protocol. They proposed a two step
classification procedure: first, they used statistical features
with random forest to classify three classes (that is, voice,
chat, others), and then they used payload data with a CNN
model for classifying other classes. This method is also not
suitable for early prediction. A combination of CNN and
stacked auto-encoders (SAEs) were used in [3] to classify
traffic types and applications of ISCX dataset [24]. Their
approach achieved over 90% accuracy for the classification
of 17 apps. However, these studies focused on a handful
of classes and treated deep learning models as black-box
without investigating the features their models rely on.
In [25], the authors investigated several combinations of
deep models, including CNNs and long short-term mem-
ory (LSTMs), for classification of 15 services, including
Office365 and Google. They also studied the combination
of header and time-series features as input and their best
model achieved about 96% accuracy. In [26], a CNN model
was used to classify five protocols and five applications,
separately. They converted time-series features into a 2-
dimensional image by using reproducing kernel Hilbert space
(RKHS). They achieved 99% accuracy for 5-class classifica-
tion. Interestingly, in their paper, SVM and decision tree also
achieved over 97% accuracy.
In [20], a general guideline for applying deep learning
models for the traffic classification was provided along with
a general framework for capturing data, selecting a suitable
deep model, and extracting proper input features. Although
most traffic classification studies fall under the general frame-
work, there is no concrete study to show that the framework
works for large-scale classification problems with numerous
classes.
In [2], the authors used a transfer learning approach to
obviate the need for large labeled datasets. First, they trained
a CNN model that takes the sampled time-series features of
a flow and predicts several statistical properties of the flow,
such as average packet length and average inter-arrival time.
Then the model weights were transferred to a new model
and the new model was trained on a small labeled dataset.
The paper also showed that classification based on sampled
time-series is feasible. In [4], the authors used a CNN model
in multi-task learning framework to obviate the need for a
large training dataset. They used a combination of a large
unlabeled dataset and a small labeled dataset to train a model
that predicts 3 tasks: application, bandwidth, and duration
of flows. Both approaches were only studied on small-scale
problems, with as few as 5 classes. Moreover, transfer learn-
ing is shown to have inherent security vulnerabilities [27].
Instead of classifying various traffic types with different
underlying protocols, a few studies focused only on traffic
of SSL/TLS protocols. In [28], the authors defined a new
set of statistical features and used C4.5 and random forest
to identify 9 services. In [29], [30], the authors used header
information in SSL/TLS packets to create a fingerprint cor-
responding to a first-order [29] or second-order [30] homo-
geneous Markov chain. They achieved high accuracy on a
dataset of 12 web services. In [31], the authors extended the
previous work by adding a weighted ensemble classifier to
improve the accuracy. The model was also extended in [32]
to include length block sequence that considers the context of
packets in a time-series manner to further improve the accu-
racy of fingerprinting. However, these approaches only work
for SSL/TLS traffic and cannot be used for general mobile
app identification where a wide range of protocols, including,
SSL/TLS, unencrypted HTTP, RTP, SRTP, MTProto, etc.,
co-exist. Furthermore, these studies only considered a few
classes and it is not shown to be scalable for a large number
of classes.
B. SMARTPHONE TRAFFIC IDENTIFICATION
A wide range of analysis has been done on smartphone traffic
[33], including identifying users by the pattern generated
from their set of installed apps [34], producing fingerprints
of apps from their unencrypted HTTP traffic [35], inferring
sociological information (e.g. religion, health condition, sex-
ual preference) [36], discovering the geographical position
of a smartphone [37], detecting information leakage [38],
identifying user actions [39], [40], etc.
In [41], the authors used the size and timing of 802.11
frames from WiFi traffic to identify 13 iOS apps. They used
random forest and achieved over 90% accuracy. However,
it is only suitable for data captured on WiFi. In [5], [42],
AppScanner was introduced, which is an approach to identify
mobile apps using statistical features extracted from the
vector of the sizes of packets. They captured the traffic
of 110 most popular apps in Google Store and achieved
high accuracy. However, they simply removed ambiguous
traffic without identifying them automatically. They extend
AppScanner in [5] by adding a module to identify ambiguous
traffic and removing them automatically. However, they were
not able to identify the source app of the ambiguous traffic.
In [43], the authors used the website fingerprinting
method, proposed in [44], [45], to identify a large number
of apps using three ML methods, including Gaussian naive
Bayes and Multinomial naive Bayes. They only used the
packet size of the first 64 packets and achieved maximum
accuracy of 87%. Their dataset only contains Android traffic
and it only works with captured data from WiFi. Despite
their high accuracy on the collected dataset, they concluded
that each device and Android/iOS version produces different
packet size fingerprints. Hence, to have a practical model
that uses their method, one should collect data from all
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combinations of devices and Android/iOS versions, which
is impractical. Additionally, they completely ignored user
activities and they only captured sessions with no meaningful
interaction. In [46], AntMonitor, a framework for collecting
and analyzing network traffic, was introduced. They studied
70 Android apps. They used SVM and took 84 statistical
features from traffic flows as input. They reported on F1
measure of 70.1%. However, both these methods are not
suitable for early prediction. Furthermore, their dataset only
contained very limited traffic types obtained only from a few
Android devices.
Recently, deep learning has also been applied for mobile
app identification. In [47], a two-stage learning was proposed
that performs unsupervised feature extraction in the first
stage. The first stage does not need labeled data and can use
public unlabeled data to improve accuracy. The second stage
is a supervised category mapping using labeled data. They
used variational auto-encoders and reached high accuracy for
12 apps. In [48], and their extended work [6], the authors
investigated several deep learning architectures, including 1-
D CNN, 2-D CNN, LSTM, SAE, and multi-layer perceptron
(MLP), to identify up to 49 mobile apps. They used the
first N bytes of the payload or both payload and header,
depending on the setting, and reached up to 85% accuracy
for top-1 classification. They used the dataset containing 49
mobile apps generated by real user activities in [49]. In [50],
Aceto et al. extended their previous work by introducing a
novel framework that takes two different input viewpoints
into account, namely data payload and protocol/time-series
features. The multi-modal deep learning model can improve
the performance by capturing patterns in both viewpoints. In
comparison with [6], [50], we show the applicability of deep
learning models on even larger number of classes. Moreover,
we perform occlusion analysis and identify ambiguous traffic
flows, which have not been studied in previous work.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we first introduce and define traffic objects.
Then, we explain how extracted data from traffic objects
is used as input features of our deep models. Then, we
introduce our CNN and CNN+LSTM models which aim to
solve mobile app identification and tackle ambiguous flows.
A. TRAFFIC OBJECT
Traffic object determines how raw captured packets are di-
vided into multiple units with appropriate labels. The most
common traffic object is a flow. A flow is a set of packets
that shares the same 5-tuple (i.e. source IP, source port,
destination IP, destination port, and transport-layer protocol).
In such a definition, direction is taken into account. For
example, a TCP connection is divided into two flows: one
containing packets in a forward direction (from client to
server) and the other in a backward direction (from server
to client). However, in most studies, the direction of a flow
is ignored and all packets in both directions are considered
as a part of a single flow, sometimes called biflow. In this
paper, we consider a flow with both directions because they
achieve higher accuracy and also they essentially share the
same label. For TCP connections, the beginning and the end
of a connection are easily determined by TCP handshake
packets, such as SYN and FIN. For other traffic types, such
as UDP, a threshold (often between 15 to 60 seconds) is often
used to indicate how long a flow can stay inactive before it is
considered terminated.
By observing traffic flows of a single app, we notice that
apps often generate flows that are common among others and
they are not specific to the apps that generate them. This
phenomenon is reported in [5] as ambiguous traffic. Ambigu-
ous traffic includes advertisement traffic, third-party library
traffic, etc. How to label such ambiguous traffic depends on
the purpose of the classification. For instance, for billing
purposes, it is preferred to identify the source application that
generates the ambiguous traffic. In this paper, we conduct
experiments with ambiguous traffic as well as without it to
illustrate the effect of such traffic. More importantly, we also
introduce a CNN+LSTM model that is specifically designed
to improve identification of the source application of the
ambiguous traffic.
B. INPUT FEATURES
Four types of input features are often used for traffic classifi-
cation tasks [20]:
Statistical features: These features represent statistical
properties of the entire flow, such as average packet length
or maximum inter-arrival time, and often require to observe
the entire or a considerable portion of a flow. Note that in
some cases such as [12], it was shown that statistical features
can be computed based on the first K packets and achieved
the accuracy as high as using the entire flow, e.g. the first
50 packets for maximum packet size or the first 150 packets
for average packet size. Although they showed that for some
specific statistical features of a one-directional flow, the first
10 packets suffice, it is still larger than the first six packets
used in this paper.
Time-series features: These features contain packet-
related properties of a set of consecutive packets in a flow,
including the packet length, inter-arrival time, and direction.
Although most papers use the time-series features of the first
few packets, consecutive packets from the middle of the flow
and sampled packets have also been shown to achieve good
accuracy [2].
Header: It refers to layer 3 and 4 header fields, such as
port number, IP/TCP flags, protocol, etc. Nowadays, header
fields alone often result in poor performance. For instance,
the destination port number that was once heavily used for
app classification leads to a poor performance, if used alone
[20]. Hence, it is often used alongside payload or time-series
features.
Payload: Payload data contains raw bytes of a packet that
reside on layer 4 and above, containing application data, SSL
handshake, etc. In the literature, the payload of the first few
packets are often used for classification.
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Statistical features are not suitable for online classification,
or early classification, where the result of the classification
should be available as soon as possible. In many applications,
such as routing, QoS provisioning, or filtering, early classi-
fication is inevitable. The usefulness of time-series features
heavily depends on the dataset and application within the
dataset. We find that time-series features of the first few
packets are not suitable for our classification goal. Note that
the choice of input feature heavily depends on the dataset
and one should try all possible ones to obtain the best model
as suggested in [20]. In our early experiments, the accuracy
of CNN, LSTM, and random forest models with time-series
of the first 30 packets was considerably lower than our
approach, as shown in Section IV. Hence, time-series and
statistical features are not good identifier for our dataset. We
find that payload data with deep learning models leads to
a significantly better model for our dataset, although they
are computationally more resource-hungry than traditional
machine learning algorithms.
Therefore, in this paper, we use header and payload in-
formation of the first 6 packets of a flow for classification.
For each packet, we only use the first 256 bytes of header
and payload. We find that using more bytes or packets barely
changes our model’s accuracy on our dataset. If there are not
enough data bytes in the packet, we pad the input data with
zeros. We normalize each byte to constrain it within [0, 1].
The first 256 bytes of the first six packets are concatenated
and the input is represented by a 1 dimensional vector of
length 1536.
As far as input design is concerned, we have two options:
1) concatenate all 6 packets into a single channel, or 2) put
each packet into a separate channel. In this paper, we chose
the first approach for the following reason: For example,
in the case of SSL/TLS, by analyzing the data, we find
out that depending on how TCP handshake and SSL/TLS
handshake goes, the SSL/TLS handshake packets can appear
in different packets. For instance, SSL Hello often appeared
in the third, forth, fifth, and sixth packets. Note that we do not
remove duplicate Acks or re-transmitted packets during pre-
processing because such pre-processing increases the compu-
tational complexity of an online classifier. Hence, if we use 6
different channels for each packet, the filters for each channel
have to learn the same pattern all over again for each channel,
which may need more data and computational resources.
On the other hand, the only drawback of using a single
channel and concatenating all packets is that some random
patterns may appear at the position where two packets are
concatenated. We empirically find the first option is slightly
better, but the difference is negligible.
C. MODEL ARCHITECTURE FOR APP IDENTIFICATION
The goal of app identification is to assign a correct label to
each flow only using the input features of that flow. In other
words, the input of the deep learning model is the header and
payload data of the first few packets of a flow, as explained in
Section III-B, and the output is the corresponding class label.
In our first model, we use convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) as a deep learning model for app identification.
CNNs, inspired by visual mechanisms of living organs,
work well with high dimensional inputs. Although multi-
layer perceptrons (MLPs) are shown to be powerful, they
fail to be efficiently trained on high dimensional input data
which requires a large amount of hidden parameters to be
trained. CNNs reduce the number of learning parameters
significantly by using a set of convolution filters (kernels) in
convolutional layers. These convolutional filters have only a
few learning parameters and are shifted to cover the entire
input. In other words, instead of learning parameters of each
section of the input individually, the model learns a set of
filters applied to the entire input. This also made a CNN
model shift-invariant because the same filter can detect the
same patterns regardless of its position on the input.
In addition to convolutional layers, CNNs also have pool-
ing and fully connected (FC) layers. A typical CNN structure
is shown in Figure 1. Pooling layers act as a non-linear
down-sampling. The most common form of pooling is max
pooling. In max pooling, the maximum values of each cluster
of neurons are selected and used as an input of the next
layer. Pooling layers reduce the size of their input and,
consequently, reduce the number of training parameters and
computation. FC layers are often used for the last few layers
and they are known to perform the high level reasoning.
A
Convolution ConvolutionPooling Pooling
... ...
Fully 
Connected
Output
...
A
Z
FIGURE 1: A typical CNN structure
In this paper, we use a 1-dimensional CNN, as shown in
Figure 2. We concatenate the 256 bytes of the first 6 packets
into a single vector to feed to the CNN model. The reason
we use a CNN model is that it is shift-invariant. This is
crucial because the patterns that we find out to be useful for
classification can appear almost anywhere in a packet. For ex-
ample, TCP options can appear in a range of bytes, depending
on the size of IP header and other TCP options. Moreover,
app-specific data patterns can also appear anywhere in the
payload. For example, we show that SSL/TLS handshake
extensions are very useful in classification of SSL/TLS traffic
and they can appear in a wide range of locations within a
packet. In summary, because the location of such features
are not predetermined in a packet, shift-invariant models are
more suitable.
D. AMBIGUOUS FLOW IDENTIFICATION
When a single app is running, such as YouTube, not all
traffic flows are directly related to the content of the app.
For example, some flows contain Google analytics or Ads
data. Such traffic flows that are not specific to the app and can
also be generated by other apps are called ambiguous flows.
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FIGURE 2: The proposed CNN model
A typical example of such a session is shown in Figure 3.
There are many other flows during the session. But, we only
keep 5 flows to have a clear figure. These flows are generated
as a result of the YouTube session. Hence, we are interested
in identifying the source app that causes these flows to be
generated. In other words, we want to label Google Ads and
all other ambiguous flows as YouTube. However, the Google
Ads traffic may also appear in other Google apps, such as
Google Music, where we want to label (the source app of)
Google Ads as Google Music when it generates the Google
Ads traffic. Clearly, to identify the source app that generates
the Google Ads traffic, only looking at the Google Ads traffic
itself would lead to low accuracy.
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FIGURE 3: A sample of YouTube session with ambiguous
flows
To solve the problem, we propose a multiple-flow classi-
fication scheme where several subsequent flows are consid-
ered to identify the source app of the target flow. We call
this problem flow association because, unlike typical traffic
classification, we exploit the relation of several adjacent
flows all together. Here, the target flow refers to the flow
that we are interested in identifying the source app and the
source app refers to the app that generates the ambiguous
target flow. Our intuition is that although a single ambiguous
flow may not provide enough information to identify the
source app, looking at the adjacent flows and observing their
order, patterns, and relative starting time can help identify
the source app. Hence, in our model, to identify the source
app of a target flow, we also use the next k flows. Note that in
many cases, all adjacent k flows that we feed to the model are
ambiguous flows, but our insight is that each app generates
a unique set of ambiguous flows with unique patterns and
order. Furthermore, if the target flow is not an ambiguous
flow, feeding the next adjacent flows should not hurt the
accuracy.
Interestingly, Google services generate the most number
of ambiguous traffic flows in our dataset. Hence, for the flow
association task, we focus on 7 Google classes: Google Map,
Google Music, Hangouts, Gmail, Google Earth, YouTube,
and Google Play. In addition to these traffic flows, Google
apps also generate the following flows: Google Common,
Google Analytics, Google Search, Google Adsense, TCP
Connect, HTTP, and HTTPS. So, in total, we have 7 source
apps and 7 ambiguous traffic labels. We are interested in
identifying the source app of each flow. In other words, the
final classification task is a 7-class classification (i.e. Google
Map, Google Music, etc).
To achieve this goal, we also use a type of recurrent
neural networks (RNNs), called LSTM, which is suitable
for sequential data. Such models have been successfully
applied to speech recognition, translation task, time series
prediction, and language modeling. The output of a LSTM
model depends not only on the last input, but also on the
previous inputs. In the flow association task, we can consider
each flow as a single input and the set of consecutive flows as
a sequence of input data which is suitable for LSTM.
To solve the problem of identifying source apps, we intro-
duce a two-step training process. We first train a CNN model
to predict the 14 true class labels using single flows. True
class labels refer to the 7 Google apps and 7 ambiguous traffic
labels altogether. We use the same CNN architecture and data
input format as in Section III-C, as shown in Figure 2. Next,
we use an LSTM model to predict the source application of
a flow. To do that, we feed not only the input features of the
target flow, but also the input features of the next k flows.
The structure of the model is shown in Figure 4. We first
pass each flow input feature through the CNN model that
predicts the true label. The weights of the CNN model are
transferred from the first training step, shown in Figure 2.
Then the predicted output is concatenated with the relative
time of the flow (i.e. relative to the first/target flow). Then,
it is fed as the first step of the LSTM model. We repeat the
same process for the next k flows as well. Then, the LSTM
model is expected to predict the source app of the first flow.
We hypothesize that the flows related to a single session of
an app start close to each other, as shown in Figure 3. Hence,
we define a threshold of 2 seconds to include adjacent flows.
In other words, we only feed the CNN+LSTM model with
the flows within the 2 seconds of the first flow. Otherwise,
we pad the remaining flows input with zeros. The 2 seconds
threshold also ensures that the traffic flows of two different
apps are not mixed because it is highly unlikely that a user
opens two different Google apps within two seconds. Hence,
the flows that are fed to the CNN+LSTM model corresponds
to only one app in most cases. However, in reality, the traffic
flows of two different source apps may appear close to each
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FIGURE 4: The joint CNN+LSTM model
other if one is run on the background. In Section IV-D, we
evaluate the robustness of our approach to such mixed traffic
scenarios.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we describe our large mobile traffic dataset.
Then, we evaluate our CNN-based model for app identifica-
tion task with 80 classes. We use accuracy, precision, recall,
and F1 to report the performance in different scenarios. We
also illustrate the confusion matrix to show the most common
misclassification patterns. Moreover, we perform occlusion
analysis on the SSL/TLS encrypted traffic to shed lights on
why apps using such an encrypted traffic protocol can still be
identified. Finally, we evaluate our flow association approach
using the CNN+LSTM model and illustrate it effectiveness
in identifying the source app of ambiguous flows.
A. DATASET DESCRIPTION
The data was collected under controlled mobile operators
networks in 20181. Two methodologies were used to obtain
data: 1) Human users interacting with each app, where the
data was captured by Wireshark. 2) Mobile device emulators
where scripts emulated how users access the apps without
human intervention. The human-generated portion of data
and script-generated portion are roughly the same in terms
of volume. The labels were assigned in a controlled environ-
ment where all unrelated apps were closed or removed.
The dataset contains 80 mobile apps, including stream-
ing, social media, messaging, Email, and navigation apps.
It contains app traffic for both Android and iOS devices,
except for apps that only have one version, such as Apple
Map and Bit Torrent. Figure 5 shows the frequency of each
application traffic in our dataset. As it is shown, the dataset
is highly imbalanced. To mitigate the imbalance problem in
the dataset, we use random under-sampling on the two most
frequent apps (that is, QQLive and LETV) and random over-
sampling on all apps with less than 1% frequency. The reason
we do not use more advanced over-sampling methods, such
as Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE),
1Due to the NDA with the data provider, we cannot reveal the name,
network, and other details about the dataset.
is that our input feature is high dimensional. Since we feed
the model with the raw packet payload without any feature
selection, the data points of the same class maybe far away
in the input space. So, methods such as SMOTE may create
unrealistic synthetic points.
As shown in Figure 5, the majority of the traffic flows
are TCP and only around 10% are UDP. Only streaming or
video/voice applications contain a significant amount of UDP
traffic, such as QQLive, PPLive, Facebook messenger, What-
sApp, Hangouts, etc. UDP traffic flows of Google services,
such as YouTube and Hangouts, use Google QUIC protocol.
Other UDP traffic mostly have RTP or SRTP (e.g. Skype
and WhatsApp) or some custom protocols (e.g. MTProto for
Telegram).
TCP traffic flows contain plain HTTP, HTTPS and a small
number of other protocols. HTTPS constitute 45.05% of the
TCP traffic flows and 40.36% of the entire dataset. Figure 6
illustrates the amount of HTTPS traffic among TCP flows for
each app. The traffic flows are shown based on encryption
protocols and their version. Note that SSL and TLS are
the primary encryption protocols used for HTTPS. While a
SSL/TLS connection can be established on any port number,
including port 80 [51], we do not observe a significant
amount of such flows. As it is shown, some applications
(on the right side of the figure) heavily use HTTP instead
of HTTPS. Moreover, some applications, such as Sky TV,
still use SSL 3.0 which is deprecated. Furthermore, many
applications, including Waze, Google Earth, Maxdome, still
use TLS 1.0 traffic instead of the much stronger versions,
such as TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3. As it is reported in [51], this
is mainly a result of misconfiguration by developers because
the dataset was captured using a wide range of OS versions
that mostly support TLS 1.2.
B. APP IDENTIFICATION USING CNN MODEL
1) Classification without Ambiguous Traffic
In this section, we train the CNN model, explained in Section
III-C, for the 80-class classification task. The details of the
CNN model are summarized in Table 1. Batch normalization
is also used at the end of each pooling layer. We train the
model with Adam optimization algorithm with maximum
of 30 epochs and 0.001 as the learning rate. We use early
stopping, similar to [25], where the training is terminated if
the loss function does not improve for 5 epochs. Moreover,
the whole training data is used during one epoch. Our results
are based on 10-fold cross-validation. In the first experiment,
we remove all ambiguous traffic from the dataset. It has
been shown that it is possible to remove ambiguous traffic
automatically in [5].
To compare our approach with the state-of-the-art meth-
ods, we also conduct experiments with deep learning models
on time-series features, similar to [25], and random forest on
statistical features, based on [48]. In [25], several models,
including LSTM (called RNN in [25]), CNN and various
combinations of them, are trained on time-series features.
We use their CNN, RNN, and their best performed model,
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FIGURE 5: Frequency distribution of 80 classes.
namely CNN+RNN-2, in our experiment. We use direction,
payload size, inter-arrival time, and window size (only in
TCP packets). Furthermore, we train a random forest (RF)
model similar to the experiment in [48]. The RF model takes
40 carefully handcrafted features obtained from the entire
flow [42]. Other details of our experiments are similar to [25]
and [48].
The results of the CNN model are shown in Table 2. The
highest accuracy is 99.12% when the entire 256 bytes in the
first 6 packets are used. However, due to the limited number
of IP addresses in the dataset, the model may overfit to non-
related features. Hence, we removed the layer 2 and 3 data
and further evaluated the model’s accuracy. Moreover, we
also removed layer 4 data as well to investigate the effect of
port numbers and TCP options on accuracy. In these cases,
we still used the first 256 bytes of the first six packets, but we
remove the above mentioned layers, respectively. As shown
in Table 2, by only using the payload data without any header
data, we can obtain 94.22% accuracy. This clearly illustrates
that mobile apps leave enough fingerprints for identification.
Moreover, the accuracy of identifying apps are 96.87%,
80.64%, for HTTP and HTTPS traffic, respectively. This
shows that even encrypted traffic has enough information
for a reasonable accuracy. As mentioned in Section III-B,
payload data is more suitable for classification of our dataset.
That is why RNN-1, CNN-1, and CNN+RNN-2 that use
time-series features perform poorly. Statistical features are
also not accurate in our dataset as random forest that uses
them performs worst. We analyze how our model can classify
encrypted traffic in Section IV-C.
2) Classification with Ambiguous Traffic
In the second experiment, we keep the ambiguous traffic
flows and the goal is to label them based on their source apps
that generate them. This is a significantly harder task since
certain types of ambiguous flows, such as advertisement
traffic, are often generated by multiple apps and they might
not have enough distinguishable features to properly identify
the source app. Table 3 presents the performance metrics of
the second experiment. By comparing the results to the first
experiment, we find that the presence of ambiguous traffic
degrades the accuracy considerably. However, the accuracy
of the model without header data is 84.01% which is still
higher than previous studies for large-scale app identification,
such as [5] with the highest accuracy of 73.5% for a 65-
class classification and similar settings. The biggest differ-
ence between our study and [5] is that we use payload data
for classification whereas they use time-series features. This
shows that, even in the presence of encryption protocols,
payload data still contains information that can improve the
classification accuracy.
Accuracy across different classes varies. Figure 7 shows
the confusion matrix of the second experiment. Among all
classes, Sky TV, Telegram, Picasa, and Google+ are the
hardest to classify. These apps are amongst the classes with
lowest number of samples. Moreover, according to Figure 6,
Sky TV and Picasa are amongst the classes with highest ratio
of SSL and TLS traffic which make them more difficult to
identify.
Sometimes the traffic patterns are different for different
versions of an app, particularly between Android and iOS
versions. To see whether classification accuracy is different
8 VOLUME 4, 2016
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FIGURE 6: Portion of TCP flows encrypted with SSL/TLS
TABLE 1: Structure of the CNN model
- Conv1 Conv2 Pool3 Conv4 Conv5 Pool6 FC7 FC8
Number of filters/neurons 256 256 - 128 128 - 128 128
Kernel size 3 3 2 2 2 2 - -
stride size 1 1 2 1 1 2 - -
TABLE 2: 80-class classification without ambiguous traffic
Input detail Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
All layers 99.53% 98.72% 99.03% 99.12%
L 2/3 removed 98.36% 95.58% 96.78% 96.95%
L 2/3/4 removed 96.99% 93.22% 94.99% 94.22%
RNN-1 [25] 81.96% 74.36% 77.97% 78.55%
CNN-1 [25] 71.84% 70.04% 70.92% 71.27%
CNN+RNN-2 [25] 82.43% 78.11% 80.21% 80.22%
RF [48] 64.21% 59.05% 61.52% 63.58%
TABLE 3: 80-class classification with ambiguous traffic
Input detail Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
All layers 96.39% 94.67% 95.52% 95.90%
L 2/3 removed 90.55% 90.12% 90.32% 90.35%
L 2/3/4 removed 84.81% 83.21% 83.99% 84.01%
RNN-1 [25] 70.32% 67.12% 68.68% 69.61%
CNN-1 [25] 63.27% 59.94% 61.56% 62.22%
CNN+RNN-2 [25] 74.82% 70.74% 72.72% 72.97%
RF [48] 61.83% 59.29% 60.53% 61.24%
for iOS and Android, we test the performance separately.
Table 4 presents the performance metrics of the two versions
with a model trained only on the payload data. Although our
dataset contains more samples of Android apps, the accuracy,
recall, and precision of the two versions are not significantly
different.
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FIGURE 7: Confusion matrix of the 80-class classifier
We also test the performance on different types of traffic.
As shown in Table 5, the highest performance is obtained for
unencrypted HTTP which is around 45% of the entire dataset.
UDP traffic covers about 10% of the entire dataset and the
accuracy is lower than the unencrypted HTTP. HTTPS traffic,
covering around 40% of the entire dataset, has the lowest
accuracy. Although, the encrypted traffic should supposedly
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TABLE 4: Performance of iOS vs Android (L 2/3/4 re-
moved). Dist stands for distribution of the traffic within the
entire dataset.
Device Dist Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
iOS 43.61% 84.11% 83.35% 83.74% 83.41%
Android 56.39% 85.31% 83.98% 84.63% 84.54%
TABLE 5: Performance of different traffic types (L 2/3/4
removed)
Traffic Dist Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
TCP 89.58% 84.46% 83.52% 83.99% 83.72%
UDP 10.41% 88.25% 86.71% 87.47% 86.76%
HTTP 45.58% 91.72% 91.43% 91.57% 91.60%
HTTPS 40.36% 76.66% 74.53% 75.58% 75.43%
not reveal information about the content of the traffic, the
accuracy is still significantly high (75.43%) for 80-class
classification. In Section IV-C, we analyze the features that
allow the classification of the SSL/TLS traffic by conducting
occlusion analysis.
Figure 8 illustrates the confusion matrix of only the
HTTPS traffic. The majority of the other apps are classified
correctly by our model even for HTTPS traffic, as shown
in Figure 8. The recall of the AppleMap, and BitTorrent
classes were almost zero because both of these classes have
a small number of samples and among them only a small
portion of samples are HTTPS. KuGoo’s recall for HTTPS
is also extremely low since it has the lowest number of
HTTPS samples (0.042% of all HTTPS flows). Note that the
overall recall of these classes are high because the majority
of their flows are non-HTTPS and our model can correctly
identify them. The recall of the AppStore, BaiDuYingY,
Google+, IMO, Opera, Picasa, SkyGo, SkyTV, SpeedTest,
Telegram, Thunder, Zalo, and uTorrent are also less than
60%. Although, some of these apps have many HTTPS
samples, their low recall shows that they have similar features
to other applications that make the classification difficult. For
example, IMO traffic is often confused with Instagram and
Facebook.
C. OCCLUSION ANALYSIS
In this section, we perform occlusion analysis to reveal the
features that allow the model to classify HTTPS encrypted
traffic. We do not analyze the unencrypted HTTP traffic
because deep packet inspection (DPI) methods have been
shown to be effective on unencrypted traffic and it is trivial
that payload information in traffic such as HTTP provides
significant information about the apps. Moreover, for occlu-
sion analysis of UDP traffic, we need to know the exact
protocol (e.g. RTP, SRTP, DTLS, etc.,) used in each flow to
be able to associate each byte of the payload to the protocol’s
fields. However, it is not possible for the majority of UDP
traffic flows that are captured in the middle of the route to do
such analysis. Hence, we only perform occlusion analysis for
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FIGURE 8: Confusion matrix of the 80-class classifier on
HTTPS traffic
HTTPS traffic in this paper.
Occlusion analysis has been used extensively in image
recognition task to show the sensitivity of CNN-based mod-
els to different components of an input image [52]. Typically,
it is done by blocking a part of an image at inference time
to see how it affects the classification accuracy. For example,
one can block the trunk of an elephant on animal classifica-
tion task, to see how much the model is sensitive to the trunk
for classification.
In this section, we replace different parts of SSL/TLS
handshake fields with a default value at inference time to see
the effect of that fields on the classification accuracy. Note
that not all traffic flows contain all SSL handshake fields.
Moreover, each handshake field can appear at a wide range
of bytes within a packet, depending on the size of previ-
ous layers and order and existence of SSL/TLS extensions.
Hence, we wrote a parser that parses the entire packet and
finds the target SSL/TLS fields and replaces it with a default
value (zeros).
Table 6 presents the result of the occlusion analysis on
the HTTPS traffic using SSL/TLS. Handshake fields with
the most significant impact on the accuracy are highlighted.
Extension number zero, or Server Name Indication (SNI),
is the most important field in the SSL/TLS handshake. The
importance of SNI is not surprising since it contains the des-
tination hostname a client wants to connect and sometimes it
is even used to obtain the ground truth [28]. Cipher info is
also useful for classification because it covers a wide range
of cipher suite’s combinations that may reveal target apps.
Interestingly, SSL/TLS length also helps app identification.
This is because different combinations of the extensions lead
to different SSL/TLS length values and may reveal target
apps.
Interestingly, unassigned extensions (number 54 to 65279)
also have an impact on the accuracy. It is reasonable because
these extensions are used in a custom way by apps and it
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TABLE 6: 80-class classification occlusion analysis
Occluded part Accuracy
- 75.43%
Version 75.34%
Record+Handshake Length 59.31%
Handshake type 75.44%
Rand (Client Hello) 71.40%
Rand (Server Hello) 75.31%
SID info (Client Hello) 71.84%
SID info (Server Hello) 75.30%
Compression info (Client Hello) 75.43%
Compression info (Server Hello) 75.43%
Cipher info (Client Hello) 51.67%
Cipher info (Server Hello) 75.36%
Certificate info (type 11) 74.39%
Server key exchange info (type 12) 75.43%
Client key exchange info (type 16) 75.43%
All extensions 27.52%
Extension #0 (SNI) 38.19%
Extension #5 (Status request) 75.40%
Extension #10 (Supported Group/Elliptic Curves) 72.20%
Extension #11 (Elliptic curve point format) 74.93%
Extension #13 (Signature algorithm) 75.01%
Extension #16 (App layer protocol negotiation) 72.26%
Extension #18 (Signed certificate timestamp) 75.12%
Extension #23 (Extended master secret) 74.87%
Extension #35 (Session ticket) 73.97%
Extension #54-65279 (Unassigned) 66.32%
Extension #65281 (Renegotiation info) 72.36%
Cipher info (Client), All extensions 12.42%
Cipher info (Client), All extensions, Rand (Client) 8.20%
is highly unlikely that two apps use the same unassigned
extension. So, for apps that use unassigned extensions, it is an
important feature for classification. We observe unassigned
extensions across 7 different mobile applications, including
Gmail, Tango, and BBM.
It is interesting to see that removing the random number in
the client hello also slightly degrades the accuracy. Note that
the random field in the client hello packet consists of GMT
time and a random number. In our dataset, some applications
are captured at only a few time instances. As a result, we
believe that the GMT part of the random number is probably
exploited by the model. In a completely unbiased dataset, the
client random number should not affect the performance of
the model.
Our analysis is mostly based on client hello and server
hello packets. Note that we only use the first 6 packets of
each flow for classification. As a result, we mostly feed the
model with the client and server hello packets. Only a small
portion of flows has server certificate, server key exchange,
or certificate request in their first 6 packets, but we found out
that it did not have a significant role in the model’s accuracy.
Note that our model achieved acceptable accuracy for 80-
class classification. Hence, we did not take more packets into
input features to avoid making the model highly complex
for a negligible performance gain. Moreover, using fewer
packets for classification is more suitable for early (online)
classification. That is the reason we only report data fields of
client and server hello packets in Table 6.
TABLE 7: 7-Google-class classification with ambiguous traf-
fic (Thr stands for threshold)
Model Thr Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
CNN - 92.01% 91.97% 91.99% 91.98%
CNN+LSTM 0.5 95.37% 95.01% 95.19% 95.08%
CNN+LSTM 1 95.88% 95.91% 95.89% 95.91%
CNN+LSTM 2 96.35% 96.23% 96.25% 96.23%
CNN+LSTM 3 96.30% 96.23% 96.26% 96.29%
CNN+LSTM 4 96.32% 96.19% 96.25% 96.29%
RNN-1 [25] - 77.17% 75.47% 76.31% 76.41%
CNN-1 [25] - 71.38% 68.06% 69.67% 69.97%
CNN+RNN-2 [25] - 82.56% 81.08% 81.81% 82.13%
RF [48] - 70.87% 66.24% 68.47% 68.89%
D. SOURCE APP IDENTIFICATION FOR AMBIGUOUS
TRAFFIC
1) Multiple Flows Evaluation
In this section, we show that our flow association approach
with multiple flows can better solve the identification of
source apps of ambiguous flows. In this section, we only
focus on 7 Google services that generate the most ambiguous
traffic flows, that is, Google Map, Google Music, Hangouts,
Gmail, Google Earth, YouTube, and Google Play. Although
we show that 80-class classification is achievable, one can
easily divide traffic flows into several groups based on the IP
addresses. For instance, Google traffic flows can be identified
by the pool of Google IP addresses. However, the IP address
is not accurate for fine-grained classification of apps. Hence,
we still need a classifier that looks into payload or other
features. In all the evaluations in this section, we remove all
layer 2 to layer 4 data headers.
Similar to Section IV-B, we first train the CNN model,
described in Section III-C, for Google service classification.
The training procedure for the CNN part is explained in
Section III-C. We use a single LSTM layer with 50 units and
dropout ratio of 0.5. For the CNN+LSTM model, we re-train
the entire model with Adam optimization algorithm with
maximum of 50 epochs. Other training parameters are similar
to Section III-C. The performance results are shown in Table
7. As it is shown, the single-flow classification only achieves
91.98%. Note that RNN-1, CNN-1, and CNN+RNN-2 mod-
els take time-series features as input, whereas our CNN and
CNN+LSTM models take payload data.
To improve the accuracy of ambiguous flows, we conduct
an experiment, explained in Section III-D. We first train
the CNN model to classify all 14 classes, including both
Google apps labels and ambiguous class labels, shown in
Figure 2. Then, we transfer the weight of the CNN model to
the CNN+LSTM model, shown in Figure 4. Then, we train
the CNN+LSTM model with multiple flows as described
in Section III-D. For each flow, we find that the next two
flows (within two seconds of the target flow) are enough
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for multiple-flow classification with high accuracy. So, we
feed the CNN+LSTM model with only three flows. The
performance of the CNN+LSTM model is shown in Table 7.
The multiple-flow classification improves the accuracy more
than 4% which is significant since the majority of Google
traffic is encrypted. There is a trade-off between accuracy and
how early we can make a prediction. As the time threshold in-
creases, the accuracy improves. However, it is also desirable
to classify apps as early as possible. Given the accuracy does
not significantly improve for thresholds that are larger than 2
seconds, we choose the 2-second threshold. Note that there is
a higher chance that flows are generated from different apps
if we consider two far away flows in the time domain. Hence,
we choose a relatively small threshold that does not affect
accuracy too much.
2) Robustness Analysis
In reality, however, traffic flows of other Google apps may
appear close to the target flow. In such cases, the second or
third flows that are fed to the CNN+LSTM model may not
have the same source apps as the first/target flow. To evaluate
the robustness of our model to such a mixed traffic flows,
we conduct the following experiment with noisy data: First,
we duplicate each sample (containing 3 adjacent flows) in
our dataset. Then, for each duplicate sample, we randomly
replace a flow in our multiple-flow input with a random flow
from another source app. The modified samples mimic traffic
when captured in the real world where apps are not run in
isolation. The results are shown in Table 8. The number after
R represents the flow number that was replaced: R3 means
only the third flow is replaced, R2 means only the second
flow is replaced, and R23 means both second and third flows
are replaced with random flows of another app. In Table 8, T
represents the scenarios where we also train the model with
replaced flows to mimic the flows in a real network.
As is shown, the model is pretty robust when only one flow
(out of three flows) is replaced with another app flows (R2
and R3 scenarios). However, when two flows are replaced
(R23 scenario), the accuracy of the CNN+LSTM model with
multiple flows becomes lower than the CNN model with a
single flow (Table 7). This is reasonable because it adds noisy
data at inference time without training the model to handle
such noisy data. However, if we train the model to deal with
such a mixed traffic scenario, the model outperforms single
flow classification in all scenarios of mixed flows (R2+T,
R3+T, and R23+T). That is probably because the model
learns to identify mixed traffic and it only uses the second
and third flows when it is related to the first flow. Therefore,
our flow association formulation with CNN+LSTM model
always achieves highest accuracy for app identification with
ambiguous traffic.
Note that during the evaluation, we find that if we feed the
CNN+LSTM model with the sequence of flows in reverse
order, we achieve better accuracy. In other words, we first
take the third flow, then the second next flow, and then the
first/target flow as input to the model. As it is shown in Table
TABLE 8: Robustness of the CNN+LSTM model to mixed
traffic flows. The number after R represents the flow(s) num-
ber that was replaced. T represents the scenarios where the
model trained with the replaced flows to mimic the flows in a
real network.
Scenario Direction Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
R3 Backward 95.34% 94.85% 95.08% 95.09%
R2 Backward 95.11% 94.86% 94.98% 94.99%
R23 Backward 91.20% 91.06% 91.10% 91.10%
R3+T Backward 96.15% 95.98% 96.06% 96.03%
R2+T Backward 95.25% 95.76% 95.49% 95.74%
R23+T Backward 95.59% 95.41% 95.49% 95.50%
R3 Forward 95.05% 94.99% 94.01% 95.00%
R2 Forward 95.02% 94.82% 94.86% 94.89%
R23 Forward 90.60% 90.51% 90.55% 90.55%
R3+T Forward 96.03% 95.91% 95.96% 95.99%
R2+T Forward 95.46% 95.30% 95.36% 95.38%
R23+T Forward 95.11% 94.56% 94.83% 94.85%
8, the accuracy of the model is slightly higher when it is fed
with flows in backward direction, particularly when we train
the model with noisy data. The reason is related to how forget
gates work in LSTM models. These gates help the model
forget the previous hidden representation if they receive
particular kinds of input. In many cases, particularly in the
mixed traffic scenario, the most relevant flow to identify
the source app is the first/target flow, although it might be
ambiguous. So, by feeding the first/target flow last, we allow
the LSTM model to forget the second and third flows if they
are unrelated. All the results in this section are for the input
in reverse order. However, to avoid confusion, we still use the
first flow to refer to the target flow in this section.
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FIGURE 9: Confusion matrix of the multiple-flow
CNN+LSTM model for flow association
The confusion matrix of the 7-class app identification is
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TABLE 9: 7-Google-class occlusion analysis
Occluded part Accuracy
- 90.95%
Record+Handshake Length 89.30%
Rand (Server Hello) 87.33%
Cipher info (Client Hello) 70.64%
All extensions 59.14%
Extension #0 (SNI) 87.31%
Extension #16 (App layer protocol negotiation) 88.10%
Extension #18 (Signed certificate timestamp) 79.23%
Extension #35 (Session ticket) 89.36%
Extension #54-65279 (Unassigned) 89.03%
Extension #65281 (Renegotiation info) 85.72%
Cipher info (Client), All extensions 32.85%
illustrated in Figure 9. Google Music, Hangouts, and Gmail
are the apps with the highest recall and Google earth has
the lowest recall. Similar to the CNN model for single-flow
classification, accuracy of HTTPS traffic is lower than unen-
crypted traffic. The accuracy of HTTPS traffic is 90.95%, as
it is shown in the first row of Table 9.
3) Occlusion Analysis of the CNN model for Google Services
Table 9 presents the occlusion analysis for Google services.
Here, we only report the occluded parts that degrade the ac-
curacy to lower than 90% for brevity. The occlusion analysis
of the model for 7 Google apps reveals a small difference
in comparison with CNN model of 80 apps. Instead of the
SNI extension, the most sensitive fields are client cipher info
and extension number 18. Moreover, accuracy is not highly
dependent on a single extension. But, if all extensions are
occluded, the accuracy drops significantly. In both models,
all extensions together are the most sensitive data field for
classification of SSL/TLS traffic.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce two deep learning models for
mobile app identification. We obtained a large dataset of 80
mobile apps from a large ISP in 2018. Analyzing the data
revealed that around 90% of traffic flows were TCP, of which
around 45% were encrypted with SSL or TLS. Furthermore,
many apps generate not only app-specific traffic, but also
ambiguous traffic that refers to common traffic, such as
advertisement, that is generated by many other apps.
Using a CNN model and raw payload data of the first
6 packets of each flow without layer 2 to 4 headers, we
achieve 94.22% accuracy for 80-class classification for non-
ambiguous traffic flows. When ambiguous traffic flows are
also taken into account, the accuracy of our model is 84.03%
which is reasonable because identifying the source apps
that generate the ambiguous traffic flows is a much more
challenging task. We find that HTTPS traffic flows are the
hardest one to classify. However, our model’s accuracy is
75.43% for HTTPS showing the feasibility of mobile app
identification even for encrypted traffic in large-scale.
We also perform occlusion analysis on SSL/TLS traffic
flows to understand why these encrypted traffic flows are still
classifiable. We find out that unencrypted handshake fields,
including cipher info and many extensions, reveal enough
information for identifying mobile apps.
To improve the accuracy of classification, particularly for
ambiguous flows, we introduce a CNN+LSTM model that
takes the first 6 packets of three consecutive flows to identify
the first flow. The intuition is that when an app launches, it
generates several flows in a short time and some of them are
ambiguous. CNN+LSTM model can look at several adjacent
flows and capture the relation and order of these flows which
helps improve the accuracy of traffic identification. We show
that CNN+LSTM model improves the accuracy of Google
app identification from 91.98% with the CNN model to
96.23% with the CNN+LSTM model. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first time that adjacent flows are also
used to improve accuracy.
In this paper, we use payload data and a deep model to
classify adjacent flows and tackle ambiguous flow problem.
In the future, one plan is to study how to reduce the com-
plexity of the model using time-series and statistical features
alongside a simpler machine learning algorithm. Moreover,
as more secure protocols are constantly deployed, such as
TLS 1.3 which exchanges fewer unencrypted handshake
fields, using a classifier that relies on unencrypted payload
data may not achieve acceptable accuracy. However, using
adjacent flows may help the classifier if not all adjacent
flows are encrypted with a strong protocol, such as TLS 1.3.
Moreover, one can study if adjacent flows using the QUIC
protocol can also be identified by a similar approach.
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